INTRODUCTION
In many missions, the Space Shuttle orbiter rendezvous and docks with the ISS. This allows the orbiter to deliver supplies, crew and components to the ISS. This paper assesses the hazard related to an uncommanded RCS firing while the Orbiter is docked at the ISS. The hazard occurs if an orbiter RCS thruster were to fire inadvertently while the orbiter is docked to the ISS. This paper focuses only on uncommanded RCS firing due to wire related failures -a subset of all inadvertent RCS firing.
Reaction Control System
The RCS has a number of nominal and off nominal applications. As shown in Figure 1 , the orbiter has forward, left aft and right aft RCS modules. The forward and aft RCS units provide the thrust for attitude (rotational) maneuvers (pitch, yaw and roll) and for small velocity changes along the orbiter axis (translation maneuvers). Each RCS module consists of high-pressure gaseous helium storage tanks, pressure regulation and relief systems, a fuel and oxidizer tank, a system that distributes propellant to its engines, thermal control system, and 44 reaction control jets in total.
The forward RCS consists of 14 primary and two vernier thrusters. The aft RCS consists of 12 primary and 2 vernier thrusters in each (left and right) pod.
Each RCS engine contains one fuel and one oxidizer solenoid-operated valve, injector head assembly, combustion chamber, nozzle and electrical junction box. 
The Hazard
A 'smart' wire-to-wire short in the RJD to thruster command path could cause an inadvertent thruster firing -it is a single failure which could result in loss of life or loss of vehicle. Such a wire-to-wire short could provide unintended electrical energy to a thruster command line. Doing so would allow both fuel and oxidizer valves to open and the thruster to fire. Historically, wires, cables and connectors were excluded from FMEA consideration (Ref. 2), providing they met the requirements of NSTS 08080-1 (Ref. 3) . Hence, the wire-towire failure mode had not been documented previously. This wire-to-wire failure mode has, nonetheless, received a significant amount of attention due to the newly recognized impacts of an inadvertent orbiter primary thruster firing while docked to the ISS. The risk assessment of this failure mode is the focus of this paper.
The orbiter's flight control subsystem contains another well-documented Criticality 1/1 failure mode. The RJD contains a single command channel per thruster. Each RJD channel contains discrete semiconductor transistors configured in a Darlington pair configuration. A short internal to either of the transistors in a pair can result in an inadvertent firing of that RCS thruster. The transistors' failure rate has been assessed at ~5E-8 during approach, post-dock and preundock mission periods. The entire docked phase need not be assessed, as operational steps are available to preclude this failure mode during the post-dock operations phase (Ref. 4).
RCS Wiring
The RCS command wires under consideration are between the RJDs and the RCS thrusters. The command wires extend from the avionics box to the fuel and oxidizer solenoids. The two command wires, one per solenoid, are each single conductors located inside a wire bundle. The wire bundling is based on electromagnetic interference/ compatibility. Along with the RCS command wires there are power wires in the same bundle as shown in one location of the orbiter in Figure  2 . The power and command wires are bundled together, but are not intertwined or twisted. Typically, there is an order of magnitude (×10) more power wires than there are command wires. The power wires provide power to other components in the RCS units. There are different types of power wires -the nominal power being 28V DC. There can be lower power wires on the orbiter and also higher power such as 117V AC. During the docked operational mode, depending on the state of the shuttle some power wires are activated and some are not activated. The RCS command wiring is 20 gauge single conductors. Both the thruster command wires and the power wires are Kapton-insulated wires. The command wires have a nominal 0.006" insulation thickness. Insulation thickness of the power wires will vary with the wire gauge. It has been estimated that there are 48,000 total inches of command wire between the RJD and the RCS thrusters (0.5% of total orbiter wiring). The solenoid return wires are diode protected and are of a shorter length and terminated close to the thrusters. 
Nomenclature

HAZARD CONSEQUENCE
The wire-to-wire failure mode has received a significant amount of attention during NASA's 'return to flight' efforts, due to the potential impact of an inadvertent orbiter primary thruster firing while docked to the ISS. While it was not an issue before, the growing mass of the ISS has produced a state whereby specific thrusters fired inadvertently during docked operations could result in structural damage to the ISS because of mechanical loads and plume loads. The hazard to ISS structure increases as ISS assembly proceeds. The addition of truss elements and solar arrays (12A and beyond) increases the ISS mass and structure susceptibility to overload. The time from thruster firing to structural failure in such a case may be extremely low (less than 2 seconds). While the wire-to-wire short likelihood is low, the worst-case consequence is very high -loss of both crews, vehicles, and programs.
MODEL BASED LIKELIHOOD ASSESSMENT
To determine the likelihood of the wire-to-wire short a fault tree based methodology was used. The fault tree was developed based on known and postulated failure modes.
Failure Modes Considered
Shorts upstream of the RJD and in the avionics box can be controlled and will not result in a thruster firing. The failure modes considered are focused between the RJD and RCS thrusters, because shorts in the wire downstream of the avionics box connecting to the thrusters cannot be adequately controlled by the current design. This and other related issues are currently being studied and addressed by NASA.
If a single command wire were to short to a power source (i.e. a power wire with exposed conductor), it could result in an uncommanded RCS firing. This requires two exposed conductors on adjacent wires, intimately in contact with each other, one of which is a thruster command line and the other is an adequate power source (capable of activating the solenoids). The reason that a short between one command wire and the power wire is sufficient for a thruster firing is that, for other design considerations, both fuel and oxidizer command wires are joined together at the RJD and again at the thrusters. Thus, a short on any one command wire will create a spurious signal on both fuel and oxidizer lines resulting in a thruster firing.
Wire-to-wire short can occur from the following causes (Ref. 5): 1) Exposed conductors: Vibration damage (chafing), undetected maintenance damage, delamination, exposure to chemicals and elemental oxygen can cause breaches in the insulation that increases the potential for a short circuit. These may occur as: a) Multiple independently exposed wires, or b) Multiple exposed wires created from a common cause. The two main common causes were vibration induced chafing and inappropriate maintenance actions that result in multiple exposed wires. 2) Conductive path through carbonization of the wire insulation, because of a) Arc fault of undetermined cause: Arc faults are too fleeting or sometimes with too low energy to trip a circuit breaker, but these arc faults can cause carbonization of the wire insulation, and carbon is an excellent conductor. Once enough carbon has built up ("enough" depends on the type and thickness of the insulation, the power handling of the wire, and other factors), there is a potential for short circuit and fire. Although there exist arc fault circuit breakers, they are not currently installed in the orbiter. b) Resistance heating from degraded splices: Resistance heating with degraded splices is associated with numerous failures and fires. The heat generated is sufficient to destroy surrounding insulation and increase the potential for short circuit and fire. 3) Cracked, heat damaged wires: Heat damage is assumed to embrittle wire and make it more susceptible to cracking. If the cracking exists on many wires in a local area, it increases the potential for short circuit. Another failure mode, though not strictly a wire failure, included in the analysis was a connector pin-to-pin short that can also provide the same failure mode as a wire-to-wire short.
Failure Modes Not Considered
The potential failure mode of a short to the neutral wire was not assessed -they are short length wires that are terminated near the thrusters and are also diode protected. Hence, the neutral wires pose a relative insignificant hazard.
Wire failures due to sabotage and intentional damage were also not considered in this assessment. The vehicle receives zonal inspection, with multiple eyes inspecting the wires, so the chance of intentional damage going undetected is small.
Fault Tree
A fault tree analysis is a deductive failure analysis method that focuses on identifying all of the credible ways in which an undesired top event (Uncommanded RCS thruster firing while docked at ISS) can occur. Figure 3 shows a portion of the fault tree model with the undesired event at the top of the fault tree. Fault trees consist of logic gates and basic events as inputs into logic gates. The fault tree gates specify the logical combination of events that lead to the gate event. In Figure 3 the top event can be caused by a number of gate events that are the failure modes listed in the previous section.
Since the fault trees were developed in SAPHIRE, the symbols used in the fault tree are those of SAPHIRE. Each of the transfer gates (with triangles) indicates that the logic is continued on a different page. The complete fault tree is not shown in this paper due to space consideration but is reported in reference 6. Instead, a short description is provided for each of the branches of the fault tree. The pin-to-pin short can occur if an extraneous piece of conducting material falls on exposed pins of a not fully mated connector while docked at ISS, creating a short between the power and the command pins. The pins of a connector may be exposed if the connector is not fully mated or if the wire to pin connection is exposed. Good maintenance practice precludes these failures, but human error may cause this hazard to occur.
The failures due to a conductive path through carbonization (pyrolization) of the Kapton wire insulation includes two possibilities -a wire arc fault or resistance heating from degraded splices. Both of these failures destroy the surrounding insulation and increase the potential for short circuit. The arc faults, although the result of complex interactions, are treated as an undeveloped basic event (complex events that are not further developed by fault tree logic) in the analysis. Resistance heating of degraded splices can only occur if there are splices in the command/power wires, one or more of these splices have degraded, and the degradation was not detected during wire inspection.
Heat damage to wires is unlikely as they are protected from high heat. Heat damage causes cracking of the wires, but requires moisture to provide a path for short circuit. Heat damage and moisture are considered as a common cause as they are likely to affect all the wires in a general area.
Exposed conductor shorts are developed in two separate fault trees -one analyzing multiple independent wire failures and the other developing common cause failures. Multiple independent exposed wire failures requires exposed conductors on a command wire and a power wire that occurred independently of each other and that these two exposed conductors should be adjacent to each other. If they were not co-located, then there would be no chance of a wireto-wire short.
Two types of failure modes were hypothesized for common cause failures that could cause co-located wire insulation failures. The first is due to orbiter vibration that could cause chafing of wire insulation resulting in multiple exposed wires, while the second is due to inappropriate maintenance actions. Given an RCS command wire chafing event, a potential for short circuit exists only if more than one wire is chafed and if the adjacent wire is a power wire. Chafing is assumed to be unlikely to occur wire on wire in the same bundle. Two inappropriate maintenance actions were examined in the fault tree model. The first is where a tool is dropped on the wires during maintenance and the force of the impact causes multiple wire insulations to be damaged so that the conductors are exposed. The first failure mode, impact with a tool, is not likely to cause a short because the impact is typically on one side of the wire and even though the damage to the wires is co-located there is intact insulation back to back between the wires. However, to be conservative this failure mode is assumed to create a potential for a short. The second failure mode is where a small metal-debris gets lodged in the middle of a wire bundle. Subsequent maintenance actions like moving the wire bundle by hand or even the action of sitting and moving a protective surface over the wire bundle could cause the metal piece to grind away at the insulation of multiple wires resulting in exposed conductors that are adjacent to each other and a piece of conductive material joining them -creating a potential for short circuit. Vibration of the orbiter could also lead to the same end state. In both cases these inappropriate maintenance actions have to be undetected during inspection for the failure to occur.
Basic Event Failure Probabilities
The values of the basic events in the fault trees are the probability of basic event occurring during one mission with the orbiter docked at the ISS.
Data:
The basic event probabilities were derived from the following:
• Significant wire damages seen in OV-102's major maintenance of 1999. OV-103 inspection data also corroborated the OV-102 data. OV-102 and OV-103 refer to the orbiter vehicles Columbia and Discovery, respectively. • NASA's Problem Reporting and Corrective Action (PRACA) database, and • Generic human error rates for maintenance errors.
Assumptions:
In addition to the data, the following assumptions were made to derive basic event probabilities specific to the analysis:
• All wires are equal. The model makes no distinction between the different types of wires in an orbiter. Some are twisted pair or twisted quad; shielded or unshielded; while others are two separate pieces of wire as in the RCS command wire and the power wire.
• Wire failure rate is not increasing with time. Although most of the wires have been in the orbiter since production, many wire experts believe that because of care and maintenance these wires are not showing signs of aging. Some preliminary data analysis of wire shorts does support this assumption.
• Wire failures are proportional to length of wires. This assumption is based partially on convenience -to establish a failure rate per unit length of wire. The vehicle wide observed damage was extrapolated to populate the RCS thruster command line wiring with comparable damage. Given that there are 150 miles of orbiter wiring and knowing that the RCS command wires do not go through any hot spots (like the payload bay) this was the best assumption with the limited time and resources.
• Power wires surround the RCS command wire and have sufficient power to activate the RCS thruster solenoids.
Since there is an order of magnitude more power wires the first part of the assumption is apt. While docked at the ISS only a fraction of the power wires carry power. So the second part of this assumption is conservative.
• Where there are exposed power and command conductors adjacent to each other, the wires are assumed to be touching so that a wire-to-wire short can occur. This assumption is based on the knowledge that the voltage/current used in orbiter applications will not jump vacuum gaps. For many failures this is a conservative assumption because the power wires in a bundle are not adjacent along the entire length of RCS command wire.
Even when the wires are geometrically adjacent to each other, the thickness of the insulation separate the wires so that they are not touching. For failures that carbonize the Kapton wire insulation, being adjacent is sufficient since the carbonized insulation becomes a conductor and is a path for a wire-to-wire short. In some cases of chafing damage, wires may get frayed and be a path for a short. So, this assumption is a conservative one in some cases.
• The mission length is assumed to be the entire time from launch to return. The basic event failure rates are not established in terms of time, only in terms of per mission. This model assumption ignores the possibility of shorts being observed during launch and actions being taken for this short not to recur during the orbiter's docked state. The launch environment is more extreme in terms of vibration and hence increases the probability of a wire-towire short, while the docked environment is more benign and less likely to create a short. These nuances suggest that this assumption is also a conservative one.
• OV-102 inspection caught all, or most, wire failures.
Baseline wire inspections were performed with the intent of accessing as much of the wire as is possible without affecting disassembly of primary structure or installed 'hard' infrastructure. Wire bundles were visually inspected by certified personnel, without spot tie or clamp removal, with good light, a mirror, manual rubdown and 10X magnification for anomaly resolution. The rationale behind this type of inspection is that the outer wires in a bundle provide a protective layer, and only if there were signs of wire failure in the outer layers would there be inspection of the inner layers of the wire bundle. According to orbiter wire maintenance engineers this is a good assumption.
• Arc tracking is possible at lower voltage levels. The nominal power voltage is 28V DC. Tests at NASA have shown that arc tracking is extremely difficult to initiate, however Ref. 7 shows that arc tracking re-strike is possible at these low voltages. There was no data to justify changing this assumption.
• There has been a six-fold maintenance improvement since 1999. This is not strictly an assumption, but was the result of data analysis. However, there was not enough data to provide statistical confidence in this result and hence it is listed as an assumption. After the baseline wire inspection of OV-102 in 1999, there has been a conscious decision to improve wire maintenance practices. Wire maintenance engineers believe all of the concerns identified have been eliminated since 1999 due to improved procedures while working with and working around wires, and due to design changes of wire protection equipment and wire clamping and holding mechanisms. In fact, they believe that there is probably a two orders of magnitude improvement in wire maintenance procedures. Changes in the assumptions may cause the numerical value of the probabilities to change, but the structure of the fault tree will remain the same.
Probability of Uncommanded RCS Firing
Quantification of the fault tree leads to the probability of the top event, wire-related "Uncommanded RCS thruster firing while docked at the ISS," to be 1.4E-4 per ISS docking mission -an improbable event that is unlikely to occur in the life of any one orbiter. This failure probability can be compared to other loss of Shuttle events that have been assessed in the order of 1E-2 per mission.
However, the discussion in the assumptions section leads the authors to judge that this number is on the conservative side, i.e., the failure probability is smaller than 1.4E-4 /mission. Two assumptions, Wire is not aging and Wire failures are proportional to length of wire, were judged by the authors to be neither conservative nor optimistic. Two other assumptions, Maintenance improvement and Effectiveness of inspection method, were judged to be potentially nonconservative. The rest of the five assumptions were judged to be potentially conservative.
The predicted top event probability was examined in terms of the contribution of the various failure modes. The most likely causes were common cause failures. The most likely cause of a short in the RCS signal wires is due to an arc fault in the bundle of power wires (7.7E-5 /mission). The next most likely cause is due to vibration damage (chafing) that can breach the insulation of multiple co-located wires creating a potential for a short circuit (6.2E-5 /mission). Typically, the mechanism for chafing is rubbing against adjacent structure or other components. The metallic structure or component may also provide a path for short circuit of the RCS signal wires. However, these two most likely results were based on extrapolation of failure data that needs to be verified with additional assessments that was not possible in this study.
Inappropriate maintenance actions, resistance heating from degraded splices, and shorts from heat damaged wires were estimated to be 2.5E-6, 2.6E-7, and 1.0E-7 /mission, respectively. The other two failure modes were insignificant.
Sensitivity Analysis
Knowing that these results were dependent on the data, a sensitivity analysis was carried out to find parameters most important to the results. The four most important parameters are listed in descending order: • Significant wire failures in OV-102 • Post-1999 maintenance improvement factor • Length of wire in the orbiter • Probability of multiple wires being chafed given a chafing event In all of these sensitivity analyses the top two contributors continued to be arc fault and chafing.
EMPIRICAL LIKELIHOOD ANALYSIS
The previous section discussed a model-based methodology that accounted for all known potential wire failure modes. In this section an empirical analysis is presented, where the probability calculation is based only on
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the failures (and, failure modes) seen until now. This methodology requires fewer assumptions.
Orbiter Interconnect Wire-to-Wire Shorts
Reference 4 documented the number of short circuits experienced over the life of the orbiter vehicles, during both in-flight and ground operations periods. The short circuit data was extracted from the PRACA database. Various queries were developed to ensure a high fidelity, comprehensive result. The query results were individually scrutinized for applicability to the failure mode in question, i.e. electrical short circuits in the interconnect system. Supporting databases, e.g. the In-Flight Anomaly database, were utilized to corroborate or expound upon the results from PRACA.
The results of the PRACA queries captured short circuits occurring during mission operations, ground turnaround processing and Orbiter Major Modifications / Orbiter Maintenance Down Periods. The report found a total of 51 short circuits of varying degrees and circuit types, i.e. intermittent, hard-failed, instrumentation circuits, power circuits, etc. Six of the 51 shorts occurred in-flight with the balance occurring during ground operations. Two wire-towire shorts were found. One occurred during the STS-6 mission while the other was experienced during ground testing in 1995. Both wire-to-wire incidents appear to have had workmanship root causes. Up to 19 unexplained anomalies identified interconnect short as the most probable cause of the anomaly.
The physical dissimilarity between the inadvertent thruster firing wire-to-wire short and the 'simple' shorts led to the conclusion that such 'simple' shorts should not be used as a basis of comparison. However, the two wire-to-wire shorts, while not directly comparable, could be utilized as credible values in assessing the quantitative probability of failure of the RJD command path wiring. Due to extensive testing and checkout carried out for unexplained anomalies, unexplained anomalies were ruled out as likely wire-to-wire shorts.
Probability of RCS Wire-to-Wire Short
Reference 8 derived a failure rate based on these 2 wire-towire short and 193,352 hours of ground and flight operation. Then knowing that 0.5% of the total orbiter wire was the RCS command wire length and with 175 hours of average docked time, derived the probability of wire-to-wire short causing an uncommanded RCS firing while the Space Shuttle is docked to the ISS as 9.0E-6 per mission. Using the χ 2 distribution, the 95% confidence rate is 3.3E-5 per mission.
This method also has a number of assumptions, most of them similar to those listed for the model based methodology.
DISCUSSION
Wire failures causing an uncommanded Orbiter RCS firing while docked at the ISS is a credible event. It is a high consequence event that could, in the worst case, lead to loss of both crews, vehicles, and programs. This hazard is a low probability event, judged to be an improbable event that is unlikely to occur in the life of any one orbiter. The failure probability was conservatively assessed to be 1.4E-4 per mission based on a fault tree methodology that examined all known failure modes. An empirical analysis based on observed failures, derived the failure probability as 9.0E-6 per mission. In terms of relative risk, this failure probability is about two to three orders of magnitude smaller than other undesirable Shuttle events.
NASA has been examining a number of proposed mitigation measures, both for the wire-to-wire short and the Darlington pair transistor failures. Each of these mitigation measures has a cost, technical risk, and will affect the orbiterprocessing schedule.
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